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This paper explores the new market-mediating mechanisms linking SU invention on 
the one hand and economic growth on the other. Two such mechanisms come to our 
mind under venture capitalism (of which venture capitalism is directly involved only 
in the first): 1) a systemic rather than haphazard link between radical inventions and 
the emergence of new product markets; and 2) a link between new product markets) 
on the one hand and invention & unbundled technology markets on the other. The first 
highlights not only the volatility and precariousness of the R&D companies which 
operated prior to venture capitalism, but also, and related to this, the weak links that 
existed then between radical invention and the emergence of new markets. There are 
two aspects of 2) above: 2a) derived demand for improvements in the product and 
process technology underlying a market (and industry); and 2b) a  demand for a 
substitute, disruptive technology which could replace the existing one. In both cases 
market size signals the ‘benefits’ to be derived from improving or substituting the 
underlying technology.  
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The information and communication technological revolution has led to a new set of 
private (venture capital) and public (epitomized by NASDAQ) capital markets for 
‘technology companies’ including SUs which, by supporting such companies and 
enabling the anticipation of returns, have for the first time in history, promoted the 
creation in advanced economies of a specialized segment of ‘inventor’ companies.
2 
These markets which emerged in the US during the 1970s specialize in knowledge-
intensive assets or knowledge intensive property rights (KIPR). For this reasons they 
have been termed ‘surrogate knowledge markets’(Antonelli and Teubal 2008).  
 
The new financial markets are becoming a key component of an innovation driven 
novel  institutional setting and subsystem termed “Venture Capitalism” which is key 
for a new model of ‘knowledge-based’ growth potentially relevant not only for 
information and communication technologies (ICT) but also (with adaptations)  for 
biotechnologies and new technologies at large.  
 
However, the new financial markets by themselves would not be enough to allow the 
sustainable existence or presence of a significant segment of SU companies. For this 
to happen the continued process of ‘invention’ generated should, via innovation and 
technology diffusion throughout the economic system, lead to higher economic 
growth (otherwise the support of SU would not be sustainable). In line with this 
reasoning and with recent views on knowledge/innovation-based growth
3 this paper is 
based on the premise that innovation based growth depends crucially on the creation 
of new markets and new industries and on the restructuring of existing ones i.e on 
knowledge/innovation-based structural change
4. These ‘higher levels of organization’ 
provide a minimum level of stability and a platform for the diffusion of new 
technology and its improvement throughout the system. 
                                                 
2  There are numerous advantages as far as economic impact is concerned  of having an 
independent, specialized ‘inventor’ segment of companies (relative to having inventions being 
developed  and commercialized within existing incumbent companies) e.g  motivation, 
flexibility, learning, avoidance of diseconomies of scope and inherent interest in continuing to 
commercialize existing products among others. 
Throughout the paper the term NASDAQ expresses not only the leading public global capital 
market for technology companies but the concept itself of ‘public market for technology 
companies’. While transactions involving equity of ‘technology companies’, both SU and 
well established high tech companies (‘incumbent companies’), are undertaken in NASDAQ, 
the venture capital market involves private equity transactions of high tech SU only(SU are 
young  ‘inventor’ companies whose initial and main activity is R&D. For the definitions of 
venture capital and of private equity (PE) see Lerner 1999 and Avnimelech and Teubal 2006).  
3 See Saviotti and Pyka (2004) and other papers, Fageberg, Guerrieri and Verspagen (1999) 
and, for industrializing economies, Rodrik (2004). 
4 In some of the chapters of Fageberg et al it is argued that European growth lags because of 
weak specialization in new ICT-driven product and services sectors. While the authors 
correctly point out the relevance of ‘structural policies’ to correct for this weakness their 
reference to venture capitalism as a set of infrastructures for ICT based growth is almost nil. 
In this paper ‘markets’ and ‘industries’ go together in the sense that, at this stage of our 
research, we are assuming a closed economy.   3 
 
This paper explores the new market-mediating mechanisms linking SU invention on 
the one hand and economic growth on the other. Two such mechanisms come to our 
mind under venture capitalism (of which venture capitalism is directly involved only 
in the first): 1) a systemic rather than haphhazard link between radical inventions and 
the emergence of new product markets
5; and 2) a link between new product markets 
(including  post emergence market growth which would include diffusion of 
technology to other user groups and/or markets) on the one hand and invention & 
unbundled technology markets on the other. The first highlights not only the volatility 
and precariousness of the R&D companies which operated prior to venture capitalism, 
but also, and related to this, the weak links that existed then between radical invention 
and the emergence of new markets. There are two aspects of 2) above: 2a) derived 
demand for improvements in the product and process technology underlying a market 
(and industry); and 2b) a demand for a substitute, disruptive technology which could 
replace the existing one. In both cases market size signals the ‘benefits’ to be derived 
from improving or substituting the underlying technology
6.  
 
The above themes will be implemented by suggesting an evolutionary theory of the 
emergence of new markets (based on what markets are as social institutions). 
Moreover our attempt to begin to unravel the above dynamic will suggest ways to 
assess the dynamic efficiency of venture capitalism.  Thus if venture capitalism 
enhances the rate of new market (and industry) creation, then venture capitalism could 
indeed be a dynamically efficient form of modern capitalism.  
 
Focus and Specific Objectives 
 
In line with the works quoted above concerning the role of new industries/markets on 
economic growth, this chapter is based on the premise that under venture capitalism 
the prime  mechanism by which invention affects economic growth is through the 
emergence of new product markets (and industries). These would provide a relatively 
stable quantitative platform for diffusion of new technology originating both in SU 
and in incumbent companies (thus avoiding chaos). Moreover, due to the existence 
under venture capitalism of an  independent inventor segment of companies (SUs), 
current structural change does not compromise future structural change based on 
disruptive technologies and new markets/industries (thus avoiding stasis).
 7 
                                                 
5 Radical innovations are defined as those leading to the creation of new markets/industries 
(they may or may not be disruptive of existing markets. 
6 The former is an extension of Schmookler’s analysis which focuses at the sectoral level, on 
how demand (expressed by gross investment in capital goods) induces new patents on capital 
goods’ improvements (see Schmookler 1966) and in some cases may give rise to ‘unbundled’ 
technology markets); while 2b relates to the analysis of Tushman an others (See Tushman and 
Andersen, 1986; and Andersen and Tushman, 1990). 
 
7 This view is in accordance with evolutionary theory which strives to achieve a balance 
between variation and selection/development (or reproduction/inheritance/retention) thereby 
avoiding both  stasis  and  chaos  (Nelson 1995). In this paper ‘variation’ is provided by 
‘invention’ (particularly SU invention); while ‘selection/development’ is associates with the 
creation of new multiagent structures like new markets/industries/clusters etc (in short, MAS, 
or higher level organizations) and their impact. In this paper ‘markets’ and ‘industries’ go 
together in the sense that, at this stage of our research, we are assuming a closed economy.   4 
The specific objectives of this chapter are: 
(i)identify the distinctive characteristics of ‘markets’ conceived as dynamic, social 
institutions underpinning structural change and innovation based economic growth; 
and propose a dynamic process of emergence of a new market
8; 
(ii)Identify specific dynamic sequences (partly co-evolutionary partly not) linking SU 
invention to new product markets and indirectly, to new disembodied technology 
markets (involving both ‘improvements’ and ‘disruptive technologies’); and 
(iii) Link the above to selected contributions in the innovation, technological change 
and growth literature with the objective of generating an integrative framework for 
innovation-based growth under venture capitalism. 
9 
(iv)  Implications of the analysis: the dynamic efficiency of venture capitalism in 
different contexts (and accompanying policies); and NASDAQ as a paradigmatic new 






2.1. Finance and innovation 
 
The relationship between finance and innovation is crucial. Radical uncertainty and 
hence major knowledge and information asymmetries shape the interaction between 
perspective funders and perspective innovators. Different institutional solutions have 
been elaborated through time. Emerging venture capitalism seems to mark a third 
phase. The ‘innovative banker’ and the ‘corporation’ have preceded venture 
capitalism. Schumpeter was able to identify these two phases.  
 
In his Theory of economic development Schumpeter stresses the central role of the 
provision of appropriate financial resources to entrepreneurs. The natural interface of 
the entrepreneur, as a matter of fact, is the innovative banker. The banker is 
innovative when he is able to spot new opportunities and select among the myriads of 
the business proposals that are daily submitted, those which have higher chances to 
get through the system. With a given quantity of financial resources the innovative 
banker should be able to reduce the flow of funds towards traditional activities and 
switch them towards the new firms. Actually the innovative banker should be able to 
identify the obsolete incumbents that are going to be forced to exit by the creative 
destruction that follows the entry of successful innovators. 
 
The amount of competence and expertise that are necessary for a banker to fulfill such 
a role are clearly impressive. As Schumpeter himself realized this model, although 
                                                                                                                                            
 
8 See the related paper Antonelli and Teubal 2008b with further develops some aspects of 
Markets. 
9 More specifically we will consider Schmookler’s ‘demand’ for improvement innovations in 
capital goods; Rosenberg’s machine tools innovation leading to a separately identifiable 
machine tool industry (with references to the General Purpose Technologies’ literature); 
Teece’s and Gans/Stern’s analysis of the strategy of companies undertaking invention 
(particularly SU); Tushman, Anderson and Christianse’s notion of disruptive technologies; 
and Coase’s work on Markets and Transaction Costs.   5 
practiced with some success in Germany in the l ast decades of the XIX century 
suffered from a number of limitations.  
 
As Stiglitz (1985; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) have shown,  equity finance has an 
important advantage over debt in the provision of funds to innovative undertakings 
because it can participate into the bottom tail of the highly skewed distribution of 
positive returns stemming from the generation of new knowledge and the introduction 
of new technologies (Hall, 2002). This has important consequences both in terms of 
reduction of both the risks of credit rationing and the costs of financial resources for 
research activities. Lenders in fact need to charge high interest rates in order to 
compensate for the risks of failure and to sort out a large portion of the new research 
activities to avoid as many ‘lemons’ as possible. Equity investors instead find an 
equilibrium rate of return at much lower levels because they can participate into the 
huge profits of a small fraction of the new ventures. The fraction of lemons that equity 
can support is much larger than that of debt, hence, as a consequence, financial equity 
can provide a much larger amount of funding for research activities.  
 
The access to financial markets for innovative projects is seriously limited by the 
radical uncertainty that characterize both the generation and the exploitation of new 
knowledge. Perspective lenders and investors are worried by the combined high levels 
of risk a) that the activities that have been funded with their own money will not 
succeed, and b) that the new knowledge, occasionally generated, will not be 
appropriated by the inventor, at least to an extent that makes it possible to repay the 
credits and remunerate the capital invested. Even in the case of a successful 
generation, lenders have good reasons to worry a bout dissipation stemming from 
uncontrolled leakages of proprietary knowledge. As a consequence worthy inventive 
activities and innovative projects risk to be sorted out in the credit market (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981).  
 
Schumpeter not only realized the limits of the first model but clearly understood the 
asymmetry between debt and equity in the provision of funds for innovative 
undertakings. The analysis of the corporation as the institutional alternative to the 
‘innovative banker’ has been laid down in Capitalism socialism and democracy. Here 
Schumpeter identifies the large corporation as the driving institution for the 
introduction of innovations. His analysis of the corporation as an innovative 
institutional approach to improving the relationship between finance and innovation 
has received less attention than other facets (King and Levine, 1993). Yet Schumpeter 
is very clear in stressing their role as internal markets where the resources extracted 
by extra-profits can better match the competences of skilled managers and the vision 
of potential entrepreneurs. Moreover the corporation can act as an intermediary 
between the credit markets and the provision of funds for new innovative 
undertakings. The corporation can borrow, acquire financial resources at low costs for 
the low risks associated with its status of large incumbent with barriers to entry, stir 
and select new undertakings, fund directly the new ventures and participate directly in 
the provision of selective equity. The intrinsic asymmetry between the provision of 
credit and equity to new ventures is solved by means of the internal financial markets 
that favour the matching between resources, technological knowledge and market 
competence. Schumpeter praises the large corporation as the institutional device that 
makes it possible to increase both the incentives and the efficiency of the innovation 
process. The internal markets of the Schumpeterian corporation substitute external   6 
financial markets in the key role of the effective provision and correct allocation of 
funds combining financial resources and entrepreneurial vision within competent 
hierarchies. 
 
The corporation has been able for a long part of the XX century to fulfil the pivotal 
role of intermediary between finance and innovation. Yet the discontinuities brought 
about by the ICT revolution have progressively undermined its efficiency. The span of 
competence of incumbents was unable to match the new radical technologies: a case 
of lock-in-competence could be observed. Venture capitalism seems more and more 
likely to emerge as the third major institutional set-up able to manage the complex 
interplay between finance and innovation when radical changes take place. 
 
2.2 The Emergence of Nasdaq and Venture Capitalism
10 
 
The core of Venture Capitalism is the triplet  SU segment, Venture Capital and 
NASDAQ where the latter represents ‘global (public) capital markets for technology 
companies’. Venture Capitalism as a system arose during the 1960s and 1970s in the 
US in response to the early phases of the  ICT revolution (integrated circuits, 
minicomputers and microprocessors) which enhanced the relative advantage of 
specialized inventor companies (SU) viz a viz incumbents. Most inventive activity 
prior to venture capitalism took place in house within incumbent companies which 
also were involved in production and/or marketing of goods
11. With a background of a 
continued process of creation of new technological opportunities the central process 
can be visualized as comprising four phases: 
I) Bundling in the VC investment market and facilitating KIPR’ asset creation  (in SU)  
II) Trading KIPR in VC markets 
III) Creation/Emergence of Nasdaq as a Public Capital Market focused on IPOs 
IV) Transformation/Expansion of Nasdaq into a Public Capital Market for KIPR 
 
A dynamic, phase analysis leading to emergence of a VC market/industry in Israel can 
be found in Avnimelech and Teubal 2006 (for a dynamic comparison with VC in the 
US see Avnimelech et al 2005). We therefore focus below on the emergence of 
NASDAQ. 
 
Phase I: Bundling in the VC investment market and facilitating KIPRs’ creation (in 
SU’s) 
As mentioned, since the early days of VC the financial product offered was equity 
finance as distinct from  loans that were the prevailing product offered by existing 
financial institutions (Banks). Equity finance was offered to SU bundled together with 
added value which included business services +management advice, management 
services, certification and networking functions as well. This was exchanged for SU 
                                                 
10 See Antonelli and Teubal 2008a 
11 By and large under the prior ‘mass production paradigm’ the producers of new technology 
i.e incumbent companies undertaking R&D were also the users, there being only a small 
segment of what then were termed ‘R&D companies’ or ‘contract R&D organizations’. These 
facts coincide with the view of economists during the 1960s and 1970s which, while 
acknowledging the existence of some knowledge/technology transactions, assumed that 
markets for technology were either imperfect or non-existent (see Arrow 1962). For 
technological revolutions and new techno-economic paradigms (including the mass 
production paradigm), see Perez chapter 2 (Perez 2003).   7 
shares and other rights concerning the management of the company. The bundling 
aspect is, for a (new) VC market, an additional dimension of what has been termed the 
dominant (product) design which lies at the origin of what will become a new 
market.
12 In this early phase of the VC market, venture capital  stimulates and co-
evolves with  the  organizations specializing in creating KIPR-high tech start up 
companies (SU). 
 
Phase II: Trading KIPR’s in Private VC Exit Markets 
The company shares received were transformed through the passage of time into 
bundles of Knowledge, Managerial Competence, Innovation Capabilities, etc (KIPR) 
particularly so when the original VC investment took place at the seed or early phase 
of SU operations where R&D is the main activity (in practice this is defined as the 
period between SU foundation and early, non-routinary sales say during the first 5-6 
years of operation).
13 This  was the result of the  financial and other added value 
received by SUs which, together with the experience accumulated, underpinned the 
inventive activity of such companies. 
Since NASDAQ as a fully public market did not yet exist (till approximately the mid 
1970s), VC exits took place principally through the sale of SU (or M & A)  or so-
called trade sales that is sales of A VC shares in a SU to individuals or organizations. 
These are private transactions an increase in the volume of which might eventually 
have triggered a private VC exit market. During the first half of the 1970s we also 
observe Over The Counter (OTC) initial offerings of shares of SU’s undertaken under 
the aegis of the recently formed new institution-NASDAQ. At the time these were yet 
another form of privateVC exits through sales to specific individuals or organizations 
rather than to the public at large. 
 
Phase III: Creation/Emergence of NASDAQ (Public Capital Market for IPOs) 
Eventurally NASDAQ became a new market for selling KIPR to the public at large 
rather than only to private individuals or organizations. Our hypothesis is that initially 
NASDAQ was an Initial Public Offering market both for VC-backed SU (a new 
public exit option for VC’s) and for non-VC backed SU.  
 
Phase IV: Expansion/Transformation of NASDAQ into a Public Market for KIPR  
Emergence of Nasdaq with its focus on IPOs g ave an enormous boost to both VCs 
and SUs and the number of IPOs increases dramatically (see comments at the end of 
this section). This in turn enabled exploitation of significant economies of scale and 
                                                 
12 There is a third  precursor dimension to the emergence of  a new VC market—a  new 
intermediation form which could be defined as the mutual adaptation of the supply agent (i.e 
the new financial intermediary) and the demand agent of the new market, and of both with the 
underlying institutional structure. In the US during the 1960’s and 1970’s this involved 
limited partnerships as the dominant VC organizational structure and  a SU organizational 
form and strategy which allowed for dilution of founder equity positions and a capital (jointly 
with the prevailing product) market orientation. It also involved liberalization of the 
constraints on Pension Fund investment in VC funds (Gompers and Lerner 1999) 
 
13 To be precise: with the exception of the so-called seed or pre-seed investments the equity 
transacted during the first VC transaction with a particular SU already embodies an initial 
bundle of Knowledge, Managerial Competence and Innovation Capabilities. The additional 
inventive activity which VC investments permit should therefore be visualized as an accretion 
rather than creation of these (bundled) assets.   8 
scope and a momentum for further expansion (dynamic economies or cumulative 
processes with positive feedback).  NASDAQ thereby eventually became the market 
for KIPR transactions in general. Beyond Initial Public Offerings which involved SU 
directly, we find various classes of KIPR’s transactions involving other agents 
without SUs participating (i.e between existing holders of KIPR’s and other 
participants). These include transactions involving specialized investors or 
demanders/suppliers of KIPS only, transactions involving the public at large as both 
demanders and suppliers; and other transactions involving both the public on the one 
hand and specialized agents (e.g. financial investors and specialized 
demanders/suppliers of KIPR) on the other. Nasdaq in effect became a Supermarket 
for products generating income streams for the general public (see sections 5 & 6).
14 
 
2.3 Innovation strategies of SU companies and SU-incumbent company links 
 
The transition from SU invention to emergence of a new product market may take 
many forms, depending on numerous factors including SU strategy and its success in 
accessing the required complementary assets to transform the invention/new 
technology into an  innovation(Teece 1986) and in some cases into a new 
industry/market. In some industries, SU’s became the driver of a creation of a new 
market; in others i ncumbent companies in existing markets accessed the new 
technology and became the dynamic factor leading to the new market/industry.  
 
Gans and Stern (2003) have undertaken a systematic theoretical analysis of the 
strategies of SUs with radical inventions. They follow and extend the analysis of 
Teece 1986 by considering a number of  additional  strategic options opened up by 
Venture Capitalism (only marginally considered by Teece) particularly concerning SU 
‘cooperation’ with incumbent companies in the relevant market. ‘Cooperation’ in their 
analysis is an ‘aggregate category’ essentially linked to  licensing 
knowledge/technology (in their terminology, the market for ideas) and to related SU-
incumbent mergers, strategic partnerships or incumbent acquisition of  the SU. The 
licensing and strategic partnership option played a relatively minor role in Teece since 
his emphasis lies in profiting from innovation through accessing complementary 
assets either through vertical integration or through market contracts with  external 
suppliers of inputs e.g marketing services  or ‘stardard production’ services. Teece’s 
emphasis on ‘product market’ transactions as the main means to profit from 
innovation reflects the relative underdevelopment of  the institutions of venture 
capitalism at the time
15. Gans and Stern’s new ‘capital and knowledge transaction 
                                                 
14  The  expansion/transformation of  NASDAQ (Phase 4 above) is  a  post emergence 
cumulative process with positive feedback involving a number of processes which make the 
market more and more attractive to increasingly larger sets of agents (both demand side and 
supply side). The reasons are similar to some extent to those invoked to explain the dynamics 
of venture capital or cluster emergence.  The new sets of agents that participate in the new 
market include specialized agents providing services to investors or companies e.g investment 
banks, brokers, consultants, etc; specialized new intermediaries e.g  VC/PE funds, financial 
investors, etc. The enhanced volume that their entry induces further reduces transactions costs 
which further  increase the thickness and frequency of transactions. This also  reduces 
uncertainty to individual investors as well as market volatility, etc 
15 While his article appeared in 1986 most of the set of illustrative inventions belonged to the 
1970s e.g. the famous CAT scanner invented by EMI. It should be mentioned here that in 
Teece’s analysis and  in contrast to Gans and Stern, inventors included not only SU but also   9 
options for profiting from innovation reflect a deepening of the ICT revolution 
including the emergence of the Internet and the World Wide Web, and the fact that 




Gans and Stern framework for analyzing SU strategies is based on two variables: a) 
the strength of the IP regime which they term ‘excludability’ of the incumbent from 
the technology of the start up
17 and b) the  ‘value of incumbent complementary 
assets’)
18. In some industries like in Drug Development and Printing, incumbents 
have successfully acquired the new technologies developed by SU inventors. In others 
e.g. books retail selling and in some software areas, SU have adopted a head on 
competition strategy viz a viz incumbents and have profited from it (in some cases, 
like Amazon, eventually becoming the dominant incumbents themselves). The above 
analysis gives further weight to our presumption that venture capitalism is a 
sufficiently flexible form of capitalism to allow for specialized inventors of radical 
inventions to benefit from their inventions. It is however only a first step in the 
direction of fully showing the implications of venture capitalism for (new) market-
mediated knowledge or innovation based economic growth. 
 
While the above literature has, through the analysis of SU –Incumbent interactions, 
considered at least aspects of the processes by which inventions are commercialized, 
there is very little analysis of the subsequent inducements to the creation of new 
markets and industries. Inventors might make a profit from their invention (and since 
the 1990s probably more through capital and knowledge transactions than through 
product market transactions) but this does not assure that the higher rate of growth of 
SU and SU inventions has led to a higher rate of growth of new markets/industries. 





                                                                                                                                            
incumbent companies (this reflects at most an intermediate stage in the evolution towards full 
fledged venture capitalism).  
16 This fact also explains why in their analysis of inventor strategies Gans and Stern only 
consider SU and SU inventions. 
17 High levels of excludability would correspond to Teece’s Strong IP regime and absence of 
excludability to his Weak IP regime. 
18 A‘low value’ could correspond to Teece’s generic complementary assets case, while ‘high 
value’ could correspond to the specialized complementary asset case with the addition that 
incumbents hold an important share of these. While the complementary assets variable of 
Teece and Gans & Stern differ to some extent in both cases their categorization refers to the 
extent by which these assets represent a ‘problem’ to inventor companies. 
19  It should be pointed out that neither Teece nor Gans and Stern considered the ‘higher level’  
system implications of ‘profiting’ or not profiting from invention/innovation. Thus it may be 
the case that the mechanism for transforming a radical invention/innovation into a new 
industry/market is or is not  a profitable proposition for inventor firms, so the dynamic 
efficiency implications may well depend on SU-incumbent interactions and on the 
institutional underpinnings of this process.  Alternatively it may be stated that while Arrow 
pointed out the contradiction between the requirements for ‘diffusion’ and those of 
‘invention’(Arrow 1962) we are interested in the potential incompatibility between profiting 
from invention and the building of new markets (the latter being the main source of ‘social 
profitability’).   10 
2.4 Schmookler’s Demand for Improvement Inventions  
 
The analysis of Schmookler (1966) on the role of demand in pushing innovation can 
be applied to our concerns. Schmookler found strong empirical evidence of a link 
between capital good market size (as indicated by gross investment) on the one hand 
and capital good improvement inventions (as indicated by patents on capital goods, 
with a lag) on the other (Schmookler 1966). Moreover when it comes to explain the 
distribution of patents on capital goods improvement inventions across industries, 
‘demand’ overrides any differences in the ‘supply’ side of inventions. His analysis 
suggests that the emergence of new product markets in general and not only capital 
goods’ markets will, through a ‘demand’ effect, induce improvement inventions in the 
underlying product and process technology. 
20What Schmookler does not consider is 
that the size of new product markets, by  signaling  the ‘need’ for the underlying 
‘technology’ and therefore of improvements to such a technology, is also indicative of 
the opportunity for introducing alternative, substitute technologies (section 3)
21. Thus 
once a new product market emerges (e.g. as a result of venture capitalism) and begins 
to grow a point may be reached when the private ‘benefit’ from developing a 
disruptive technology may become such to induce ‘technology suppliers’ like SU 
companies to undertake disruptive technology development. In contrast to 
Schmooklers assumptions, it is not possible here to avoid considering substantial 
supply side differences across industries and technologies (these have also been 
considered in Rosenberg’s critique of Schmookler) so the link between market size 
and disruptive innovations is probably less clear and much more influenced by supply 
side considerations than what it appears in Schmookler’s analysis of ‘improvement 
innovations’. Also, under venture capitalism and due to the advantages it gives to 
specialized inventors (incidentally, this is the language used by Schmookler), 
frequently the source of supply of the new disruptive technology may be high tech SU 
companies. The result may be one or more technology transactions.  
 
2.5 ‘Market’ and Market Building  
 
An effort to understand the institutional characteristics of markets in a general context 
seems necessary in order to grasp properly all the implications of the creation of the 
new financial markets associated with venture capitalism. Markets are social 
institutions that perform a variety of functions and exhibit different forms, 
organizations and characteristics. Moreover markets are a dynamical construct. Hence 
markets are being created, emerge, occasionally their performances and functions 
improve and possibly decline. In other words, markets evolve. 
 
What is missing in the literature is a Theory of Markets as Social Institutions which 
includes markets’ role not only in the allocation of resources but also in promoting 
‘knowledge-based growth’. This theory should also make a distinction between simple 
                                                 
20 Schmookler’s analysis is based on patents on capital goods in the United States during the 
late 1930s and early 1940s and on building a concordance between patent classes and 
industries, It suggests that venture capitalism’s force in creating new product markets will 
also lead  to new transactions on technology  improvements, and given other conditions, to 
new unbundled markets for technology. 
21 I.e technological discontinuities which could be either competence enhancing or 
competence destroying (Tushman and Anderson 1986). These radical changes can also 
reinforce/change or be disruptive of existing markets.   11 
markets and multilayer super-markets such as NASDAQ which enable participants to 
relate to a number of markets simultaneously thereby better coordinating their needs 
to the capabilities offered. A related gap in the literature is an evolutionary theory of 
Market Building or market creation (the notion of Emergence might be crucial here) 
 
The above issues are also applicable to knowledge markets and there are some 
additional specificities which should be tackled. Thus there seems not to be a 
distinction between an unbundled and a bundled knowledge market; and no analysis 
of the links between the two. Moreover there has been little discussion of the 
dynamics of the links between radical invention on the one hand and the creation of 
new knowledge markets and of the link between new product markets and new 




3.  A DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE TO MARKETS AND MARKET BUILDING 
 
3.1 The Notion of “Market”  
 
There are two well established notions of ‘market’ in the literature:  i)  textbook, 
abstract notion where it is self-evident that m arkets  exist so that  any transaction 
presupposes existence of an underlying market; ii) markets as devices for reducing 
transactions costs and thereby facilitating exchange (Coase). 
 
A major contribution to the discussion of markets comes from Coase whose work 
clarifies both (i) and (ii) above. “In mainstream economic theory the firm and the 
market are for the most part assumed to exist and are not themselves the subject of 
investigation”  (Coase 1988, Chapt 1, p.5; our italics). By mainstream economic 
theory Coase means Economic Theory without transaction costs. Transactions costs 
are the costs of market transactions that include “search and information costs, 
bargaining and decision costs, and policing and enforcement costs” (Dahlman 1979, 
quoted by Coase) which of course, includes the costs of contracting. In Coase’s 
theory, transaction costs exist and can be important; and they explain the existence of 
the firm: “Markets are institutions that exist to facilitate exchange, that is they exist in 
order to reduce the cost of carrying out exchange transactions. In Economic Theory 
which assumes that transaction costs are non-existent markets have no function to 
perform”(Coase op. cit. p.7).
22  
 
There is a third notion of ‘market’ originally proposed by A. Smith, namely a device 
that promotes division of labor, learning/ innovation, and economic growth. This is 
the notion we would like to futher develop here. Our position is that it is not possible 
to uncover the distinctive characteristics and functions of such a dynamic view of 
markets exclusively by making reference to Coase’s facilitation of exchange and 
reduction of transactions costs. This could be one of the outcomes of a market. 
However if markets have to be built, then the required pre-conditions for emergence 
became central. This because other factors are in play e.g asymmetric information, 
                                                 
22 Coase (1988) discusses the elements comprising a market e.g. the medieval fairs and 
markets that comprise both physical facilities and legal rules governing the rights and duties 
of those carrying out transactions.    12 
and a critical mass of producers and consumers (since there is an important element of 
collective interaction and of collective transacting); and because, rather than 
spontaneously making their appearance, markets emerge or are built.
23 
 
A  related reason for focusing on other factors beyond transactions costs when 
analyzing the links between markets and growth is that markets could contribute to 
growth through the incentives they generate to new inventions and innovations, 
particularly adaptations and improvement innovations leading to diffusion of generic 
new technologies to an increasingly larger set of uses, sectors and product classes
24. 
While this  diffusion process is linked to lower transactions  costs there are other 
important contributory factors such as learning and capabilities’ accumulation 
(Rosenberg 1961). Moreover, effective diffusion and economic impact of generic 
technologies may depend on the creation of other markets and industries whose 
creation, as we have seen, depend also on other factors beyond transactions costs. 
 
The upshot is that new markets are required for knowledge-based growth; and 
analysis of their emergence or building should be centre piece in any theory of 
economic development nowadays.  From this viewpoint the emergence of a perfect 
market can be considered the result of an articulated institutional process that deserves 



















                                                 
23 Our agenda is therefore not only to define and explain the role of markets but also to 
identify the processes of emergence of new markets. This will include analyzing the 
conditions under which a set of ‘precursor’ transactions will not  lead to the emergence of a 
new market (in terms of Industry Life Cycle Theory this could be termed ‘left hand 
trunkation’). Moreover, explaining emergence will require making reference to other 
variables e.g. scale economies in building the market place (Antonelli and Teubal, op. cit). 
24 Innovations may affect the value chain and increase the degree of ‘roundaboutness’ in the 
economy. For an analysis on these lines see Rosenberg’s study of the machine tool industry in 
the US in the 19
th Century which resulted from processes of vertical disintegration and 
technological convergence. It is clear from his analysis that the economic impact of the new 
set of machine tool innovations depended on the creation of an industry and, by implication, a 
market (Rosenberg 1976).    13 
3.2 Defining Characteristics and Functions of Markets 
 
Box 1 lists the defining characteristics of markets following the above mentioned 
dynamic perspective; and Box 2 shows these relate to market functions
25 
 
Box 1: Defining  Characteristics of Markets* 
A well defined Product/Service Category 
A Dominant Design and Product Standards 
A Market Place (‘space’, organization or information highway) 
A Critical Mass of  Supply and Demand Agents 
A Critical Mass of Transactions Volume 
A Measure of Stability of Supply and Demand  
 
Agent interaction 
A measure of reputation 
Transparency of Transactions 
 
Saves Transactions Costs compared to an equivalent but disconnected set of 
transactions 
Institutions and Rules underpinnings e.g. in relation to: Product Quality and 
Standardization, Certification of Agents, Transactions’ Transparency, etc. 
Emergence involves a momentum leading to further growth  product category 
diffusion  
 
Other Characteristics  
Thickness, Frequency and Recurrence of Transactions   














                                                 
25 see Antonelli and Teubal 2008b for further details. The need for a Critical Mass of Supply 
and Demand Agents (also of reputation) and of Transactions Volume derives from the need to 
assure some of the basic functions of markets (see Box 2 below): stability/reliability in supply 
and static efficiency. This point emphasizes the fact that a market does not exist with the first 
transaction in the corresponding area; rather it builds upon a substratum of prior transactions 
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BOX 2: FUNCTIONS OF A MARKET 
 
BASIC FUNCTION  LINKS TO DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS (and to 
SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS) 
Stability of Supply  Critical Mass of Agents and Transactions Volume 
Agent Coordination   Agent Interactions, Transactions     transparency  
Promoting Static 
Efficiency 
Save transaction costs, incentives to producers, 





26, inducing Division of Labor & 
Learning/Specialization, integration mechanisms, 
converting uncertainty into risk, drivers of improvement 
and disruptive technology/invention,  and  institutions 
reducing path dependence  (market demise/substitution 
by another market) 
 
3.3 Market Building  
 
A new  market may emerge when a set of previously isolated precursor transactions 
sparks an emergence process. For this to happen a number of conditions may be 
required (see below) and these may depend on area and specific context. Frequently 
these will include p re-emergence processes of interaction and information flow 
among agents together with experimentation and learning  concerning product 
characteristics and user/producer organization and strategy. In some cases like venture 
capital in the US and in Israel these led to a new, effective intermediation form a 
qualitative dimension that largely precedes the actual emergence process. Emergence 
may also require a critical mass of precursor transactions both to underpin the above 
mentioned interaction, learning and experimental process and to enhance the expected 
“benefits” derived from creating a new market.
27Moreover, when a new market place 
is also required, the successful emergence of a new market may depend critically on 
the appearance of an ‘entrepreneur’ or a c onsortium of agents in charge of 
undertaking the required planning, coordination and investments. The analysis that 
follows largely ignores this issue.
28   
 
The evolutionary process leading to the emergence of a new market is taken from an 
extended Industry Life Cycle perspective as applied to the VC industry and market in 
Israel (see Avnimelech and Teubal 2006). A central point is that the transition from a 
pre-emergence phase to emergence need not occur
29. Another feature is that new 
industry or new market emergence could be a autocatalytic, cumulative process with 
                                                 
26 By signaling strength of the underlying need a large market may provide a stronger 
inducement to discontinuous technical change or radical inventions compared to a small 
market e.g a shift from discrete to continuous process technology in the cement, glass and 
steel industries (see Tushman and Andersen 1986).   
27   The benefits include savings in transactions costs that should cover the fixed costs of 
creating and the variable costs of operating a new market (see above). 
. 
28 Not every case of new market creation requires a new ‘market place’ or at least a new 
market place requiring  significant new investments.  The new market can piggy back on 
existing infrastructures and market places.   
29 This phenomenon has been termed left hand trunkation of the life cycle (Avnimelech and 
Teubal 2006).   15 
positive feedback or alternatively, a process characterized by dynamic economies of 
scale. This process involves creation and utilization of externalities a fact which 
would explain the acceleration of growth observed in a number of industries and 
markets which eventually emerged
30.The cumulative process does not end with 
creation of the new industry; rather it continues afterwards at least for a time 
(provided that external conditions do not deteriorate)
31. The new (more complex) 
structure- created by the interaction among elementary components (firms and users) 
will, once emerged, positively further stimulate such components. This phenomenon 
provides us with an additional, and much less recognized characteristic of ‘an 
industry’: once created it will stimulate the creation of new firms
32.  
 
Box 3 summarizes the phases of emergence of a new market according to our 
perspective.  
 








Appearance of a 
‘precursor’ set of 
transactions; & of 
a critical mass of 
such transactions  
(m1) 
I.Focused  Business Experiments leads to 
the identification and adoption/selection of   
 (i) Product Class, Dominant Design and 
Product Bundling 
(ii)  supply/demand agent types,  and 
(iii)regulatory environment/institutions 
II.  Appearance of a critical mass of 
transactions (m2) with the above 
characteristics 
III.  In some cases, new mechanisms of 
interaction 
m2 (and possibly 





This leads to a 
new Market with 
emergent 
properties 
* The fourth ‘Post Emergence Market Growth’ phase is not included in the Box(see 
last paragraph of this section; and 2.2 and footnote 36  for the NASDAQ case). 
 
The above is part of a Market Life Cycle perspective that parallels the extended 
Industry Life Cycle Perspective with Background and Pre-emergence phases (Phases 
1 and 2 respectively). m1  in Box 3  is a critical mass  of precursor  (Phase 1) 
transactions required to trigger e.g. through variation, a more systematic and focused 
search and experimentation process leading to selection in Phase 2 of a product class 
and dominant design/product standard  with high value to users/demand agents 
(Abernathy and Utterback 1978).  Appropriate product/services’  bundling and, 
depending on case, selection of a new intermediation form i.e the mutual adaptation of 
the organization and strategy of supply and demand agents (and of both  to the 
institutional environment) may be critical (see Petit & Quere 2008 and Avnimelech 
and Teubal 2008b). Thus in the history of emergence of a Venture Capital market and 
                                                 
30  There are several countries where t he venture capital industry/market, when defined 
appropriately as oriented to early phase investments in high tech SU, did not emerge despite 
existence of a certain amount of activity and explicit Government policies directed to this end.     
31In the case of a market the causes of this post-emergence momentum include  lower 
transactions costs, incentives to invention/innovation, and other factors.  
32 Students of high tech clusters such as Saxenian (1994) and Fornahl and Menzel (2004) have 
intuitively recognized the relevance of such dynamics, but not quite elaborated it.   16 
industry in the US (Gompers and Lerner 1999, 2001, 2004), the supply agents (VC 
organizations) eventually adopted a Limited Partnership form of organization, while 
the demand agents (high tech start up companies) had to accept dilution of ownership 
and other changes. Meanwhile there were significant adaptations of the institutional 
environment e.g. modifications of the ERISA (Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act) including the 1979 amendment to the “prudent man” rule governing 
pension fund investments in the US (Gompers and Lerner, 2004, pp. 8,9).  
 
Sparking or triggering emergence frequently requires a critical mass of transactions 
involving the selected product class, dominant design and intermediation form (m2). 
As mentioned these should  provide a new value proposition to users. Moreover, 
whenever a new market  place  involving coordination and heavy investments are 
required, the existence of such a level of demand may be critical for the appearance of 
a ‘new market entrepreneur or consortium’ in charge of planning and building such a 
market place.
 33 
    
Left Hand Truncation 
 
The above framework suggests that failed market emergence could be the result of 
two general  causes. One is failed selection processes in phase 2 resulting from too 
little search/experimentation and/or  inappropriate selection mechanisms e.g due to 
institutional rigidity. The other is failure to spark or sustain an evolutionary 
cumulative emergence process (e.g. due to system failures which policy has not 
addressed). Not all radical inventions, even those leading to innovations and having 
potential, will automatically lead to new product markets. 
 
A related issue is the post emergence growth of new markets, with NASDAQ’s phase 
4 being the major and probably paradigmatic example of a multi or supermarket (see, 
section 2.4 and footnote 37 in the concluding section). This  will be termed Post 
Emergence Market Growth.  In previous work and in relation to new industries it was 
pointed out that the momentum leading to emergence also continues beyond this state 
(Avnimelech and Teubal 2006). Here and in relation to markets we would like to 
emphasize the following sources of such expansion: (i) the market place that serves 
the initial product market may, through economies of scope and scale, carry new, 
related categories of products (Antonelli and Teubal op. cit); (ii)  diffusion of the 
underlying product technology to new applications (see the analysis of the machine 
tool sector and market by Rosenberg, 1962) and in General Purpose Technologies 
more generally speaking); and, related to the previous point, (iii) Diversification and 
Niche Development by the leading firms who developed and co-evolved with the new 
market (this, which is frequent in many new ICT areas e.g the cases of Nokia and 
Google,  could include both new applications and developing specialized products and 
solutions for different market segments). The last two point to a link between new 
product markets and new (including ‘unbundled’) technology markets.    
 
                                                 
33 The issue of demand is critical. For example, given that frequently medieval fairs where the 
result of entrepreneurial activity (Coase op. cit) their establishment would have relied on the 
prior existence of sufficient demand which might have been dispersed geographically. Also, 
Israel’s VC market/industry emergence depended and the prior existence of a critical mass of 
SU which represented ‘demand’ for the future VC industry(A&T op. cit.).   17 
4. NEW MARKETS MEDIATED INNOVATION BASED GROWTH 
 
The new financial markets of venture capitalism supported the fledging specialized 
inventor SU segment. SU are a new institution with, in many areas, potentially strong 
advantages over incumbent companies as far as invention and beginning of 
commercial exploitation of the new ICT technologies are concerned. These and their 
impact on Economic Growth through new market building are summarized below in 
terms of a number of interlinked relationships (Modules A, B and C).
34 Module A 
links venture capitalism (and the ICT revolution) to an acceleration of radical 
inventions;  Module B links these inventions and related improvements and 
innovations to the accelerated emergence of new product markets; and Module C 
focuses on the reverse process, namely, how new product markets stimulate new 
invention (both radical and incremental) and possible the emergence of unbundled 
technology markets. We can already see that under this perspective, a push of radical 
invention (Module A) will lead to a new market mediated subsequent pull i.e dynamic 




                         (2”)Venture Capital 
(1)ICT Revolution-< (2)SU segment-￿<-- (3)  Accel.Radical Invention 
                                   (2’)NASDAQ  
 
        
The above summarizes what we have said in sections 1 and 2 (and in the litierature). 
The links among the three elements of venture capitalism( (2) above) are to some 
extent co- evolutionary. We should also be aware (not shown in the above sequence) 
that accelerated invention not only ‘inputs’ Modules B & C but feeds back into (1) the 
new set of ICT opportunities.  
 
The central issue is: what are the implications of  accelerated invention  for the rate 
and direction of Market Building processes  (element 5 in Module B). 
35  Radical 
inventions plus improvements may, through innovation and diffusion, stimulate the 
creation of new product markets (Module B) as well as Module C’s post emergence 
market growth ( and indirectly, creation of  unbundled markets 
for‘technology/invention’, see 8). There are both direct and indirect effects because 
the link between  inventions/innovations and creation of new markets is a two-way, 
                                                 
34 For simplicity we will be assuming in what follows that the Science and Higher Education 
infrastructure is not a constraining factor. 
35 A positive radical invention/innovation-new market link seems to be implied by  Teece’s 
analysis. This because his core analysis of the conditions for a positive and significant private 
profitability of invention is only of interest for those cases where social profitability has been 
high (in our conceptual framework, this implies the creation of new markets/industries, see 
Section 1 above). This interpretation is consistent with the fact that the sample of inventions 
considered  in his 1986 paper are (or mostly are) ‘radical’. We conclude that Teece’s 
conclusion that ‘inventors’ were frequently non-profitable is applicable only to those 
inventions which generated new markets/industries. Moreover, while our analysis of Venture 
Capitalism re-inforces Teece’s radical invention-> new market link it also enhances the 
possibilities that the above mentioned socially beneficial activity of inventors be privately 
profitable.      18 
possibly co-evolutionary, relationship with the mix between Radical and 
Improvement Inventions (and Innovations) being a critical dimension. T hus as 
indicated in Module C the opposite is also true, namely that existing product markets 
can induce new invention, both improvements in the technology underpinning 
existing markets (the extension of Schmookler mentioned in 2.4) and radical, 
disruptive inventions (see 9 in Module C) that reinforce the ICT Revolution’s push. 
Needless to say and following the enormous literature on these matters (e.g. Gans and 
Stern op. cit) SU-Incumbent interactions are critical to analyze the pattern of 
emergence both of new product and of unbundled technology markets (see 2.3 above).   
 
 
Module B  
 
(3) Enhanced Radical Inventions/Impro. + (4) SU￿>Incumbent links￿ 
               (5) Enhanced rate of Emergence of New Product Markets 




(6)Post Emergence Market Growth + (7) [Growth of New Incumbents & links with 
SU]-> 
(8) Improvements Inventions +some New Unbundled Technology Market 
 +(9)New Radical Inventions  
 
As with Module A the above processes are non-linear; rather they involve numerous 
feedback loops and co-evolutionary processes e.g. between invention/improvement 
and product markets; and between both and knowledge markets. As mentioned above, 
invention spurs emergence of new product markets; and new  product markets and 
their size will induce both (8) improvement inventions (and potential emergence of 
unbundled Knowledge/Technology markets  for improvement innovations)  and  (9) 
New Radical Inventions (see section 3 above)
36. Moreover, these Module C effects 
feedback into Module A thus initiating a new i nvention->market 
emergence>invention cycle. 
 
SU-incumbent links are crucial both for new market emergence (Module B) and for 
the subsequent link between post emergence market growth and subsequent invention, 
technology transactions and emergence of unbundled technology markets. Thus an 
important pattern underlying Module B’s acceleration of new market emergence is the 
transformation, either through ‘cooperation’ with incumbents or through a strategy of 
‘head on competition’, of SU invention first into ‘innovation’ (Gans and Stern op. cit 
section 2.2 above); and then and in a subset of  cases, into the building of new 
markets. In contrast, in Module C SU-incumbent links are intertwined both with the 
growth of leading incumbents (which co-evolve with the new m arkets and their 
                                                 
36 In fact a licensing market for a radical new technology may also emerge with time. This 
possibility  has not yet been incorporated into Module B as presented above. New radical 
inventions are assumed to feed back into new product market emergence  and through these to 
new unbundled markets for improvements. Alternatively we may say  that at this point we 
assume that while there may be ‘technology transactions’ around radical inventions, the 
emergence of ‘technology markets’ should be based on (subsequent) ‘improvement’ 
inventions.   19 
subsequent expansion, see 5 and 6) and with subsequent invention particularly of the 
improvement type (see 8). These links are related to incumbents’ attempts at growing 
after emergence and during ‘maturity’ of their main market. Since their possibility of 
exploring all options is limited, by necessity they develop new links with SU as part 
of  stimulating an appropriate  eco-system  for post emergence growth. Major 
differences seem to exist between the SU-incumbent links of Module A (especially in 
the ‘early’ rounds of the A-><-C cycle) and those of Module C (especially beyond the 
early rounds of the cycle). This happens because in the former the influence of new 
markets and associated ‘mature’ incumbents is not strong enough relative to the latter 
case. The strong and varied SU-incumbent links of Module C are connected both to 
the process of diffusion of the new technology underpinning incumbents’ main market 
and to the process of searching for new value for existing users. In these processes, 






5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS 
 
In previous work we (and others) have analyzed the nature of venture capitalism 
understood as the subsystem comprising a segment of independent inventor 
companies (SU) and a new private and a new public financial market supporting it by 
trading in what has been termed Knowledge Intensive Property Rights (KIPR, 
Antonelli and Teubal 2008a). KIPR bundle knowledge/technology with other assets 
e.g innovation capability, knowledge competence etc. The new financial markets, by 
virtue of trading in KIPS and therefore constituting  surrogate knowledge markets 
(together with the fact that SU create and offer KIPS), have helped to overcome the 
two central problems with knowledge creation and business sector R&D in market 
economies: the incentives problem facing inventors and inventor companies (related 
to externalities on the one hand  and to Arrow’s  disclosure paradox and the related 
non-existence or strong imperfection of knowledge markets on the other); and the 
invention/R&D finance problem (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). 
 
The present paper extends the analysis to consider the economic impact of venture 
capitalism for what increasingly  is being defined as  innovation-based economic 
growth. Central to our approach is the view that economic growth requires structural 
change which first and foremost are new markets & industries (in this paper they go 
together since we are assuming a closed e conomy); and this defines our ‘market 
mediated’ link between invention/innovation and economic growth. The core of our 
analysis is three sequential and linked modules involving the same number of sets of 
variables. Module A represents the link (largely co-evolutionary) between the ICT 
revolution and associated new technological opportunities on the one hand and (i) 
venture capitalism (as defined above) and (ii) accelerated invention/innovation 
(particularly by SU) on the other. Module B links the enhanced invention/innovation 
generated by venture capitalism to the creation or emergence of new product markets; 
                                                 
37 All three of Gans and Stern’s aspects are present: SU licensing of invention (which may 
lead to ‘unbundled’ technology markets) acquisitions, strategic partnerships and mergers.  
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and Module C an almost reverse link, namely that between  post emergence  market 
(or mature market) growth and new invention and innovation.  
 
A critical aspect of the process throughout is SU-incumbent company links. This is 
particularly so in Module C where the new incumbent companies that grew with the 
new markets (think of Nokia, Cisko and Google nowadays) require, in order to sustain 
growth despite  the onset of maturity in their original product class, a strategy of 
building the required ecosystem both to diversify and to generate specific solutions to 
particular user segments. At least some of the SU-incumbent links that emerge from 
this process are part of Gans and Stern’s cooperation strategy followed by start up 
innovation companies(Gans and Stern 2002): they include SU licensing of technology 
to incumbents; acquisition of the SU; strategic partnerships and mergers. It is 
noteworthy to mention that the new technology generated in response to large and 
relatively mature markets is both improvements inventions and radical inventions. The 
former, which relates to the licensing SU-incumbent link mentioned in the previous 
sentence, may lead to the emergence of unbundled knowledge/technology markets (as 
a derived demand from the new product markets and based on an extended 
Schmookler-type framework of analysis). The latter radical inventions, which are 
signalled by (large) markets (see section 3), may or may not be disruptive of existing 
markets. They constitute a major feedback link between what can be considered the 
first round of traversing Modules A￿C and the second round.  
 
The outcomes of the above dynamic relationships will be further enhancement both of 
the SU segment and of the new, ICT related, capital markets serving them (Module 
A). The Module C stimulus of radical inventions and new SUs represent a ‘demand 
pull’ effect which complements the ‘supply push’ impact of continued new ICT 
related technological opportunities (which revolution is propelled by other factors 
both exogenous and endogenous). The Open Architecture of NASDAQ and dynamic 
scale/scope economies explain why these new SU companies and more and more 
related companies e.g providing additional services, will be active in and increasingly 
be listed in NASDAQ (this process may explain both the enormous increase in SUs in 




                                                 
38 Through this process NASDAQ evolves to become  a multi/super market with strong 
dynamic efficiency implications. While a regular market for a specific good e.g. a food item 
or for shares of a specific company (or group of companies operating in a particular 
technological area) quoted in Nasdaq  coordinates the  supply and  demand of that  good,  a 
multi-market coordinates a generic need (e.g.’nutrition’ or income streams from KIPRs’ 
assets) to Capabilities which could be considered as the ‘primitives’ of standard demand and 
supply. While the link in such markets to a need category is clear this is less so in relation to 
the 'Capabilities' variable.There are two components to the  latter:  creation of capabilities 
(where the private VC market plays the critical role through its stimulation of SUs) and their 
actual coordination with needs (where NASDAQ plays the central role). Needs-capabilities 
coordination means not only coordination among agents operating in a specific ‘product 
market’ but coordination of agents operating in a large set of related markets. It follows that 
Venture Capitalism as a system will stimulate invention and, through multiagent and cross 
market coordination, will also promote innovation-based growth.  
 




The situation prior to Venture Capitalism  
 
We can compare the nature of the SU invention-new (product and also unbundled 
technology) market-economic growth links under venture capitalism with those 
prevailing prior to Venture Capitalism. Prior to Venture Capitalism, radical inventor 
SU (the so-called ‘R&D companies’, see Freeman 1974) faced difficulties in creating 
a new market. This takes place because the SU inventor frequently faced many 
obstacles either to access the complementary assets directly and profit from the 
invention (Teece 1986) or to sell the technology (see Arrow’s disclosure paradox 
limited or non extant technology markets).  Relatively speaking, prior to venture 
capitalism, radical inventions by specialized inventor companies only very 
occasionally led to new product markets
39 
 
It is possible to summarize the main reasons why the process of transformation of 
radical inventions into new product markets will become more certain, frequent and 
routinized under venture capitalism: (i) increased numbers of new SU with radical 
inventions; (ii) a new systemic & generic mechanisms of direct or indirect 
transformation of such inventions into new product markets; (iii) the effect of new 
markets and more rapid market growth on invention including radical (both disruptive 
and non disruptive) inventions; (iv) the possible emergence of unbundled markets for 
technological improvements. 
 
Another implication is that  venture capitalism creates a cumulative process of 
innovation-based economic growth  (for a time, even without continuation of an 
exogenous ICT Revolution). This involves a strong feedback process between Module 
C and Module A i.e the beginning of a new A—>C cycle. As mentioned, the key link 
here is that between post emergence market growth and subsequent  radical 
inventions-the signaling role of markets (Section 3). The fact that many of these and 
subsequent improvement inventions are SU based i.e independent companies, means 
that there also exists a mechanism to unlock the existing system from the strong path 
dependence which the combination of growing mature market and large and powerful 
incumbents may generate. 
 
The combination of continued generation of new opportunities and the mechanism for 
‘unlocking’ the system from potential, strong path dependence, assures that venture 
                                                 
39 Alternatively it could be said that Venture Capitalism creates an alternative, indirect and 
roundabout route for radical inventions of R&D companies to stimulate the emergence of 
new product markets. This route is mediated by the new capital markets (private-VC; public-
NASDAQ) associated with venture capitalism i.e a systemic effect. First, with the help of 
Venture Capital, a SU inventor may transform  the invention (e.g. a new product or new 
process prototype) into an innovation i.e. first sale of new product or utilization of new 
process at commercial scale (Mansfield 1968). This may facilitate accessing NASDAQ i.e. 
undergoing an IPO. This in turn could be a step in the creation of a new product market e.g. 
through the expansion of the SU and its successful ‘accessing’ of complementary assets; and 
through the entry of other agents into the same area through imitation or licencing of the 
technology.  
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capitalism could become a feature of sustainable innovation-based growth economic 
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